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Autistic and non-autistic adults’ agreement with scientific knowledge about autism, how
they define autism, and their endorsement of stigmatizing conceptions of autism has not
previously been examined. Using an online survey, we assessed autism knowledge and
stigma among 636 adults with varied relationships to autism, including autistic people
and nuclear family members. Autistic participants exhibited more scientifically based
knowledge than others. They were more likely to describe autism experientially or as
a neutral difference, and more often opposed the medical model. Autistic participants
and family members reported lower stigma. Greater endorsement of the importance of
normalizing autistic people was associated with heightened stigma. Findings suggest
that autistic adults should be considered autism experts and involved as partners in
autism research.
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INTRODUCTION
Traditional expert knowledge of autism derives from observations by professionals who often
lack the lived experience of being autistic1, whose understanding and acceptance of autism
might increase by listening to autistic people (Nicolaidis, 2012). Many autistic scholars and
self-advocates view autism as a form of diversity rather than pathology, and an increasing
number of researchers similarly conceptualize autism in terms of strengths and weaknesses
rather than only deficits (e.g., Pellicano and Stears, 2011). Scientifically based knowledge of
autism has tended toward greater recognition of interpersonal and developmental capacities
over time, such as the reclassification of the conception that the majority of autistic individuals
have intellectual disability from accurate (Stone, 1987) to false (Gillespie-Lynch et al., 2015)
on the Stone Autism Awareness questionnaire, a change assisted by autistic professionals who
specialize in autism, such as researcher Michelle Dawson (Dawson et al., 2007). Nevertheless,
the deficit- and behavior-based diagnostic criteria for autism that anchor autism research and
treatment continue to locate communication problems within the autistic person (American
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013) rather than examining how interpersonal interactions (De
Jaegher, 2013) and societal factors (e.g., Kapp et al., 2013; Kenny et al., 2016) contribute to the
challenges experienced by autistic people. The conception of autism as only an impairment within
autistic people has been critiqued by autistic (e.g., Milton, 2012; Yergeau, 2013) and non-autistic
(e.g., McGuire and Michalko, 2011; Dinishak and Akhtar, 2013) scholars and advocates for
1We use identity-first language to refer to autism, respecting the preference of many self-advocates (Kapp et al., 2013; Kenny
et al., 2016)
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misrepresenting mutual challenges between autistic and non-
autistic people, and facilitating misconceptions of and stigma
toward autistic people.
Increasing interest in the degree to which challenges associated
with autism arise from societal misconceptions about and stigma
toward autism has contributed to a growing body of research
examining misconceptions of and stigma toward autism among
people who are not autistic (e.g., Gray, 1993; Mak and Kwok,
2010; Campbell and Barger, 2014; Obeid et al., 2015; Harrison
et al., 2017). This research, typically conducted with non-autistic
college students, has found that greater knowledge of autism
and high-quality personal connections with autism coincide with
lower stigma toward autism (Nevill and White, 2011; Gardiner
and Iarocci, 2014; Gillespie-Lynch et al., 2015; White et al., 2016).
A much smaller but growing body of research has examined how
autistic people think about autism, including their evaluations of
how it is currently represented and researched (e.g., Kapp et al.,
2013; Pellicano et al., 2014a,b; Jones et al., 2015; Kenny et al.,
2016; Fletcher-Watson et al., 2017). The current study is the first
to compare the degree to which autistic and non-autistic people
agree with extant scientific knowledge about autism, how they
define autism, and the degree to which they endorse stigmatizing
conceptions of autism. Our central hypothesis, that autistic adults
would demonstrate greater awareness of scientific knowledge
about autism and would describe autism in less stigmatizing
ways than non-autistic people, is grounded in growing evidence
that autistic people may often have enhanced understanding of
fellow autistic individuals (e.g., Komeda, 2015) and resist medical
constructions of autism (e.g., Kapp et al., 2013).
Evidence that autistic people often build upon unique insights
derived from the lived experience of being autistic to obtain
heightened knowledge about autism as a scientific construct
would provide further impetus for emerging efforts to involve
autistic people meaningfully in autism research and design of
interventions. Recent literature reviews of participatory research
about autism, wherein autistic people are meaningfully involved
in all aspects of research, have revealed very few autism studies
utilizing a participatory approach (Jivraj et al., 2014; Wright et al.,
2014; but see Nicolaidis et al., 2011 for a strong example of
participatory autism research). Indeed, autistic respondents to
an online survey reported that interventions for autistic people
are not well-aligned with their needs and interests because
autistic people are rarely involved in designing such interventions
(McLaren, 2014).
Autistic People’s Knowledge of Autism
Failure to consider the perspectives of autistic people is
problematic not only based on principles that value active
participation by people in matters about their lives, but also
because some autistic people use the focused interests that are
part of the diagnostic criteria for autism to systematically research
autism itself (e.g., Hurlbutt and Chalmers, 2002). Analyses
of discussion forum posts revealed that many autistic adults
followed closely, and had strong opinions about, the revision
of the diagnostic criteria for autism in the DSM-5 (American
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013; Giles, 2014; Linton et al.,
2014). Moreover, interviews with three autistic adults revealed
that they had researched autism extensively and considered
themselves “the experts” on autism (Hurlbutt and Chalmers,
2002, p. 105). Nevertheless, interviews with 11 autistic adults
published a decade later revealed that participants felt that their
perceptions continued to be overlooked in favor of academic
expertise (Griffith et al., 2012). As one autistic participant stated,
“everybody is an expert bar the person with a diagnosis. That
needs to change” (p. 14).
Autistic People Question Common
Assumptions about Autism
Autistic people describe unique insights about autism derived
from the lived experience of being autistic (Jones et al.,
2013, 2015; Huws and Jones, 2015). They report that non-
autistic people often do not understand autistic traits such as
repetitive body movements, which autistic people say reflect
sensory atypicalities (Davidson, 2010; Donnellan et al., 2012)
and self-regulation strategies (Yergeau, 2016). Although autism is
defined by socio-communicative difficulties in conjunction with
restricted and repetitive interests and behaviors (RRIB), non-
autistic laypeople often define autism solely in terms of socio-
communicative difficulties and fail to recognize RRIB, including
sensory difficulties, as core aspects of autism (e.g., Bakare et al.,
2009; Campbell and Barger, 2014). In contrast, autistic people
indicate that sensorimotor challenges contribute to their socio-
communicative challenges (e.g., McGeer, 2004; Chamak et al.,
2008; Robledo et al., 2012).
Interviews with nine autistic college students at a specialized
college for autistic people revealed that they felt that only
autistic people could truly understand autism (Jones et al., 2013).
However, they felt that each autistic person could only speak
about their own form of autism rather than about autism more
generally. Participants indicated that non-autistic people have
stigmatizing misconceptions about autism. They reported that
sharing insider perspectives of autism with other autistic people
conferred a sense of belonging. An autistic co-author of this
study stated that autistic participants’ beliefs that non-autistic
people could not understand autism reflected autism-related
difficulties adopting other people’s perspectives. He asserted that
autistic people develop the self-awareness and communication
skills needed to educate others about autism with age. Indeed,
additional analyses of the aforementioned interviews revealed
that the autistic students felt that they had become increasingly
socially aware with development (Huws and Jones, 2015).
While autism researchers often interpret neutral and even
positive differences as deficits (Gernsbacher et al., 2006), autistic
adults often positively reinterpret the diagnostic criteria for
autism (Rosqvist, 2012a). Autistic people commonly report
feeling relieved when receiving an autism diagnosis in adulthood
(Punshon et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2014) and better understood
by other autistic people (Sinclair, 2010; Rosqvist, 2012b; Jones
et al., 2013). Similarly, interviews with 10 autistic adolescents
revealed that most did not feel that autism was a disability (Jones
et al., 2015). Although they recognized challenges associated with
autism, such as stigma, they valued the ways that autism made
them unique. Nevertheless, many autistic youth describe autism
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 438
fpsyg-08-00438 March 24, 2017 Time: 16:44 # 3
Gillespie-Lynch et al. Autistic Expertise
as a source of struggle or a barrier to social inclusion and yearn
for normalcy (Humphrey and Lewis, 2008).
Many autistic adults identify societal factors that contribute
to challenges associated with autism (e.g., Kapp et al., 2013).
They embrace an identity as autistic and reject “neurotypical”
behavioral norms by aligning themselves with neurodiversity, i.e.,
the viewpoint that autism is a natural identity with strengths and
weaknesses that contribute valuably to human diversity (Hurlbutt
and Chalmers, 2002; Sinclair, 2010; Nicolaidis, 2012; Rosqvist,
2012a; Walker, 2012; Kapp et al., 2013; Pellicano et al., 2014b).
The neurodiversity movement challenges the medical model,
wherein autism is framed as an impairment within the individual
that should be treated and normalized, by emphasizing positive
aspects of autism and rejecting the need to normalize autistic
people and cure autism.
The neurodiversity movement has been misinterpreted as
only representing the voices of “high-functioning” autistic
people by researchers (Bagatell, 2010; Jaarsma and Welin,
2012) and the popular media. For example, Lutz (2013), the
mother of a “lower-functioning” autistic child, wrote an article
in Slate Magazine entitled “Is the Neurodiversity Movement
Misrepresenting Autism?” She stated that the neurodiversity
movement is “a group of high-functioning individuals opposed
to medical research” because they themselves do not need it.
However, self-advocates in the neurodiversity movement vary
widely in their support needs; they often reject functioning
labels as hierarchizing development in relation to an illusory
ideal of “normal” that some autistic people are more (i.e.,
high-functioning) or less (i.e., low-functioning) close to while
obscuring contextual variations in abilities, with potentially
adverse consequences in terms of autistic individuals obtaining
needed supports (Savarese, 2010; Yergeau, 2010; Bascom, 2012;
Nicolaidis, 2012; Walker, 2012). Indeed, the neurodiversity
movement and the medical model overlap in recognizing that
supports are needed to ameliorate challenges associated with
autism (Nicolaidis, 2012). For example, an online survey revealed
that autistic adults were more likely than non-autistic people to be
aware of neurodiversity and to view autism as an essential aspect
of identity that needs no cure (Kapp et al., 2013). A subsequent
online survey replicated Kapp et al.’s (2013) finding that autistic
adults prefer terms for autism, such as “autistic person,” that
indicate that autism is a central aspect of identity (Kenny et al.,
2016).
Autistic People Recognize Challenges Associated
with Autism
Despite viewing autism as central to identity, autistic participants
in the study by Kapp et al. (2013) did not differ from non-
autistic participants in negative emotions toward autism or in
the perceived importance of supports to help autistic people
gain adaptive skills. This overlap between the neurodiversity
movement and the medical model indicates a more nuanced
perspective on disability than the standard social model
wherein impairments are believed to arise solely from societal
factors. The perspective of autism endorsed by many members
of the neurodiversity movement is more consistent with a
biopsychosocial model (Engel, 1977) of autism, wherein internal
differences interact with social factors to create challenges
associated with autism (Kapp, 2013). For example, an autistic
researcher pointed out that reduced theory of mind, which
has been postulated to be a core deficit within autistic people
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1995), is not an impairment that resides
within autistic people but rather a mutual difficulty relating, as
neurotypical people also face often unacknowledged challenges
understanding the minds of autistic people (Milton, 2012).
Further evidence that autistic adults’ perceptions of autism align
with a biopsychosocial model arises from research demonstrating
that some autistic adults recognize that autistic traits interfere
with employment and socialization, and attempt to pass as
“normal” (Griffith et al., 2012).
Stigma: A Key Challenge Associated
with Autism
Behaviors associated with autism may elicit higher levels of
stigma than the label “autism” does (Butler and Gillis, 2011).
In fact, stigma toward behaviors associated with autism is
reduced when people are made aware that the people exhibiting
the behaviors have a diagnosis (Brosnan and Mills, 2016), by
decreasing perceptions of personal responsibility for atypical
actions (Chambres et al., 2008). Indeed, autistic people with fewer
symptoms (who appear more “normal”) report higher levels of
stigma directed toward them than their more severely affected
peers (Shtayermman, 2009), possibly because non-autistic people
misinterpret them as intentionally deviant.
Stigma toward autism is reduced not only among those who
are made aware that someone has a diagnosis but also among
people who have more prior experience with autism. Studies
conducted with college students have revealed more knowledge
about (Tipton and Blacher, 2014) and less stigma (assessed
with a Social Distance Scale) toward autistic people among
a small number of participants who indicated that they had
nuclear relatives who were autistic and/or who were autistic
themselves (Gillespie-Lynch et al., 2015). Other research with
college students similarly finds greater willingness to interact
with (Nevill and White, 2011) or more positive attitudes toward
(White et al., 2016) autistic peers among those with an autistic
relative or personal contact, with further findings that the quality
rather than quantity of direct contact plays a decisive role in
acceptance of an autistic peer (Gardiner and Iarocci, 2014). White
et al. (2016) reported that those who knew an autistic person less
often identified observable behaviors such as lack of eye contact
in connection with autism, which they suggested might indicate
that with personal experience people may find that autistic
individuals do not all conform to stereotypes. Whether autistic
people’s direct lived experience with autism lends enhanced
knowledge and reduced stigma through challenging deficit-based
(mis)conceptions was not examined in prior work due to small
sample sizes.
Does a Focus on Normalizing Autism
Contribute to Stigma toward Autism?
Consistent with the lack of consideration of how autistic
individuals conceptualize autism, autistic adults continue to feel
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that their voices are not heard (Milton and Bracher, 2013;
Pellicano et al., 2014b). Indeed, researchers express skepticism
toward the prospect of yielding significant power to autistic
people (Pellicano et al., 2014a). The continued disempowerment
of autistic people is evident in the ongoing representation of
autism in ways that many autistic people (and some parents
of autistic people) disagree with strongly. Nicolaidis (2012),
a physician and the mother of an autistic child, stated that
recent autism awareness campaigns by researchers and funding
agencies that describe autism as a kidnapper of children and as a
living nightmare for families contribute to stigma toward autism.
These campaigns are extreme examples of the medical model.
A secondary aim of the current study was to investigate the
hypothesis that medical-model orientations toward autism, such
as the desire to normalize and cure autistic people, contribute to
stigma toward autism.
Aims and Hypotheses of the Current
Study
We used an online survey to examine how autistic people
and their close family members respond to commonly used
measures of “scientific knowledge” about and stigma toward
autism. This study builds upon a small but growing body of
research using online surveys to compare how autistic and non-
autistic people with diverse relationships to autism view how
autism is represented and researched (Kapp et al., 2013; Pellicano
et al., 2014a,b; Kenny et al., 2016; Fletcher-Watson et al., 2017) by
administering measures that have been used with diverse types
of non-autistic people internationally (e.g., Obeid et al., 2015;
Harrison et al., 2017) to both autistic and non-autistic people with
diverse relationships to autism.
This study was designed to assess the following hypotheses:
(1) Autistic adults and close family members of autistic people
(non-mutually exclusive categories) would express more
awareness of up-to-date scientific understanding about
autism and less stigma toward autism when compared to
people without each relationship to autism.
(2) Autistic adults would more commonly include internal
experiences in their definitions of autism, define autism as a
neutral difference, and/or critique the medical model than
non-autistic people.
(3) Participants who endorsed more of a medical-model
orientation toward autism, or expressed stronger interest
in finding a cure for autism and in helping autistic people




Approval was obtained from a university-based institutional
review board prior to recruitment of participants to an
anonymous online survey on SurveyMonkey. No compensation
was given for participation. Online recruitment advertisements
were posted on autism-related forums, weblogs, listservs, and
groups on Facebook, Meetup, Reddit, Tumblr, and Twitter, as
well as general online classified pages (Craigslist, Backpage, and
Oodle), and were distributed through the social network of an
autistic self-advocate (one of the researchers). Efforts were made
to recruit participants from diverse sources representing different
viewpoints on autism. Before entering the survey, all participants
completed a consent form.
Participants
Participants (N = 636) ranged in age from 18 to 73 years
(M = 38.0; SE = 12.9; see Tables 1, 2). Although 71.1%
of participants were from the US, participants were recruited
globally (76.5% North America, 12.0% Europe, 8.8% Australia,
1.1% South America, 0.9% Asia, and 0.6% Africa). The majority
of participants identified as Caucasian/white (86.0%); others
identified as mixed ethnicity (5.2%), Hispanic (3.6%), of Asian
descent (2.8%), of African descent (1.9%), or Indigenous (0.5%).
Participants self-identified non-mutually exclusive relationships
to autism, including being autistic (N = 309) or not
autistic (N = 327). Participants often reported multi-faceted
relationships to autism. Therefore, classification as autistic was
not mutually exclusive from other relationships to autism such
as having an autistic nuclear family member (N = 360) or not
having an autistic nuclear family member (N = 276).
After assessing baseline conceptions of autism (the focus
of this report), participants were asked to complete an online
training based on extant research about autism. In order to
assess baseline conceptions of autism among those who were
disinterested in receiving autism training, all 636 participants
who completed the pre-test were included in analyses reported
here. Note that 75.9% (N = 483) of the participants completed
the subsequent autism training, post-test and autism screener.
Although the autism training is not the focus of this report,
participation in the training was associated with increased
knowledge about autism at post-test across groups, but no
significant changes in stigma.
Measures
Measures included a demographics questionnaire, a pre-test
assessment of conceptions of autism, a training module
(Gillespie-Lynch et al., 2015), a post-test mirroring the pre-
test, and an autism screener. We embedded opportunities for
participants to elaborate upon responses to each question if they
wished to by asking: “Do you have anything else to say about this
question?”
Demographic Survey
Participants were asked to indicate their gender, age, education,
ethnicity, location, and occupation. Relationships to autism
were assessed with this question: “Please select as many of
the following types of relationships as you have had with
people with autism spectrum disorders2: yourself, your child,
your parent, your sibling, your spouse, your extended family
2We utilized the term autism spectrum disorder (ASD), or the overarching label
for autism adopted in 2013 by the DSM-5, for this question and questions about
the definition and diagnostic criteria for autism. We utilized the term “autism” for
all other questions. A number of autistic participants indicated that the term ASD
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TABLE 1 | Characteristics of participants who identified as autistic or not autistic.
Autistic Not autistic Group comparison
N 309 327
Age: means (SD) 36.25 (13.60) 39.75 (11.96) p = 0.001∗
RAADS-14 score:1 means (SD) 29.15 (8.67) 7.78 (10.03) p < 0.001∗
Ethnicity: % Caucasian 87.1 85.0 p = 0.49
% Gender fluid 7.3 1.2 p < 0.001∗
% Female 62.7 84.6 p < 0.001∗
% Nuclear family member of autistic 55.7 57.5 p = 0.69
% Parent of autistic 25.9 49.5 p < 0.001∗
% Friend of autistic 49.5 26.3 p < 0.001∗
% Teacher of autistic 19.6 10.4 p = 0.001∗
% Live in USA 64.8 77.6 p = 0.001∗
% Have high school education or less 15.8 8.1 p = 0.003ˆ
% Have graduate degree or more 17.2 31.4 p < 0.001∗
% Professionals2 20.0 35.7 p < 0.001∗
% Technicians2 2.3 1.9 p = 0.78
% Unemployed2 42.7 31.9 p < 0.001∗
∗ Indicates that groups were significantly different; p ≤ 0.001; ˆ Indicates a non-significant trend; p ≤ 0.05. 1 Ns for this measure were lower as it was administered at the
end of the survey so participants who chose not to “be trained” did not complete it: N Autistic = 231, N Not autistic = 252. 2 Open-ended responses to the question:
“What is your current job or occupation? If you are not currently employed, please say so” were coded into 11 possible categories (including unemployment) according
to the US Job classification guide: http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/jobclassguide.cfm.
TABLE 2 | Characteristics of participants who identified as nuclear family members of autistic people or not.
Nuclear family member Not nuclear family Group comparison
N 360 276
Age: mean (SD) 41.18 (11.95) 33.92 (12.95) p = 0.001∗
RAADS-14 score: mean (SD)1 18.83 (13.60) 16.94 (14.99) p = 0.15
Ethnicity: % Caucasian 88.1 83.3 p = 0.11
% Gender fluid 3.4 5.1 p = 0.31
% Female 80.8 65.2 p < 0.001∗
% Parent of autistic 67.2 0 p < 0.001∗
% Friend of autistic 37.2 38.0 p = 0.87
% Teacher of autistic 13.6 17.0 p = 0.26
% Live in USA 68.6 74.9 p = 0.09
% High school or less 10.5 13.6 p = 0.26
% Graduate degree or more 25.0 23.8 p = 0.78
% Professionals2 27.2 29.2 p = 0.65
% Technicians2 1.4 3.0 p = 0.26
% Unemployed2 44.1 39.9 p = 0.29
∗ Indicates that groups were significantly different; p ≤ 0.001. 1 Ns for this measure were lower as it was administered at the end of the survey so participants who chose
not to “be trained” did not complete it: N Nuclear family member = 270, N Not nuclear family = 213. 2 See Table 1 for description of coding scheme.
member, your friend, your coworker, your student, your fellow
student, your acquaintance, or other.” Participants were classified
as autistic if they indicated that they were autistic and were
classified as non-autistic if they did not indicate that they
were autistic. Similarly, participants were classified as nuclear
family members of autistic people if they reported having
an autistic nuclear family member (child, parent, sibling,
or spouse/romantic partner). Participants were classified as
pathologizes autism. Therefore, we describe the questions we asked with the exact
wording we used but use the terms “autism” or “autistic” throughout the rest of
this report to respect the perspectives of autistic participants.
a teacher of an autistic person if they indicated that they
had a student with autism. Participants were classified as a
friend of an autistic person if they indicated having an autistic
friend.
Autism Symptoms
The RAADS-14 (Eriksson et al., 2013) is a 14-item self-
report measure (α = 0.92 in the current study) of autism
symptoms. Scores range from 0 (never true) to 3 (true
now and when I was young). A cutoff score of 14 or
higher has strong sensitivity and adequate specificity
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in distinguishing between autism and other psychiatric
disorders.
Pretest/Posttest
In addition to the measures described below, the researchers
developed questions to assess conceptions of autism (see
Appendix A).
Autism knowledge
Our primary assessment of autism knowledge was an adapted
version of Stone’s Autism Awareness Survey (α = 0.66 in the
current study; see Appendix B). Gillespie-Lynch et al. (2015)
summarize how this survey has repeatedly been adapted to reflect
changing research.
Autism stigma
We used an adapted version of the Social Distance Scale
(Bogardus, 1933; see Appendix C). Six items (α = 0.83 in the
current study) assessed willingness to engage with an autistic
person at varying levels of intimacy (discussed in greater detail
in Gillespie-Lynch et al., 2015).
Analytic Approach
Descriptive analysis of the data indicated that the summed totals
derived from the stigma and knowledge scales exhibited excessive
kurtosis and/or skew. Although Wigley (2013) asserted that the
sums of multiple Likert scale items that exhibit high internal
consistency can be considered to reflect an interval scale of
measurement, he acknowledged that sums of small numbers of
Likert scale items (like our stigma measure) and/or scales with
fairly low internal consistency (like our knowledge measure)
retain an ordinal scale of measurement. Therefore, we used
non-parametric analyses to evaluate all key study hypotheses.
We evaluated conceptions of autism among those with each
relationship to autism (e.g., self or family member) relative to
those without that relationship rather than relative to those
with a different relationship because participants often reported
multiple overlapping relationships to autism, e.g., a participant
could self-identify as autistic and also as the parent of an autistic
person (see Table 1).
Given that autistic participants differed from non-autistic
participants in terms of a number of demographic factors (i.e.,
age, country of residence, education, and gender) that have been
associated with attitudes toward autism and other disabilities
in prior work (e.g., Corrigan and Watson, 2007; Mak and
Cheung, 2008; Obeid et al., 2015), we log transformed the data
and conducted parametric replications of key non-parametric
analyses to verify that key findings remained apparent after
controlling for gender, country of residence (USA vs. not),
education, age, and when more varied non-mutually exclusive
binary relationships to autism (e.g., autistic vs. not, nuclear
family member vs. not, teacher of autistic person vs. not, and
friend of autistic person vs. not) were entered simultaneously
into models. Although Norman (2010) asserted that parametric
tests generate accurate conclusions even when used with highly
skewed Likert scale data derived from small numbers of items,
debates about this issue are unresolved (Wigley, 2013). Therefore,
these follow-up parametric analyses should be considered only as
evidence that our primary findings are not attributable to other
characteristics besides relationships to autism.
As mentioned previously, the analyses in this report focus on
the full sample (24.1% of whom did not complete the training and
subsequent autism screener) in order to capture the perspectives
of autistic people who were disinterested in receiving training.
However, all findings except two (indicated with footnotes)
remain significant if the sample is constrained to only those
participants who completed the training and subsequent screener
in order to compare autistic people who met the cutoff for likely
autism on the screener to non-autistic people who were below the
cutoff. Due to the large number of analyses conducted, we used
Bonferroni corrections and only considered p-values ≤ 0.001
statistically significant; p-values ≤0.05 are reported as trends.
Effect sizes are reported for all significant findings (King et al.,
2010).
Qualitative Coding
Transparency about how raw data are coded and interpreted
allows readers to evaluate interpretations derived from qualitative
analyses by situating examples within a broader context (Fujiura,
2015). Coding schemes were developed using thematic analysis
guided by previous literature (e.g., Campbell et al., 2011; Kapp
et al., 2013; Gillespie-Lynch et al., 2015) and emergent patterns
in the data. Independent coders achieved reliability of 80% or
greater across all coding categories, with 20% of the data coded
independently for reliability.
Responses to the question “What are autism spectrum
disorders in your own words?” were coded into non-mutually
exclusive categories: Difference between communication
and capacity (a mismatch between expressive and receptive
communication, or atypical social communication), Social
difficulties, RRIB, Internal (experiential definition including
thinking, sensing, neurological), Opposition to the medical
model (celebrate diversity and/or societal origin to challenges),
Autism as “neutral difference” (atypical without valence),
Support for medical model (autism as pathological and/or
endorsing normalization), Confuse autism with intellectual
disability, Other, and Don’t know.
Participants had the opportunity to provide open-ended
elaborations in response to all survey questions. After reading
all of the participants’ open-ended elaborations in response to
all of the survey questions, we realized it was not feasible to
qualitatively code all open-ended elaborations due to the very
large number of open-ended elaborations. Therefore, we utilized
a mixed-methods approach to select and code open-ended
elaborations. We first identified the item from each category
of questions about autism (i.e., importance of a cure/normalcy,
stigma, and knowledge) that yielded the highest effect size when
comparing autistic and non-autistic participants’ responses to the
closed-ended question about that item (a quantitative measure of
the questions that most clearly distinguished between autistic and
non-autistic people) and then qualitatively coded open-ended
elaborations in response to those questions. Elaborations were
coded into non-mutually exclusive categories using thematic
analysis. We report the proportion of autistic participants
whose open-ended elaborations were classified into each coding
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category with illustrative examples of autistic participants’
responses.
RESULTS
Group Differences in Baseline
Knowledge and Stigma
Autism Knowledge
A Mann–Whitney U test revealed that autistic participants
(M = 17.29, SD = 4.99) earned higher summed scores on
the Autism Awareness Survey than non-autistic participants
(M = 15.46, SD = 5.67, Z = –4.19; p < 0.001; r = 0.17). A non-
significant trend toward nuclear family members exhibiting
heightened knowledge relative to participants without an autistic
nuclear family member was observed (p = 0.01). A linear
regression predicting the log-transformed autism knowledge
score, F(9,594) = 8.91, R2 = 0.13, p < 0.001, indicated that
being autistic (rp = –0.19; p < 0.001), having an autistic
friend (rp = –0.14; p= 0.001), and higher education (rp = –0.18;
p < 0.001) were all associated with greater knowledge.
Non-significant trends toward heightened knowledge among
women (p = 0.01), gender fluid participants (p = 0.04),
and participants with an autistic nuclear family member were
observed (ps = 0.02). Knowledge was not associated with having
an autistic student (p = 0.49), living in the US (p = 0.08), or age
(p= 0.59).
Post hoc Mann–Whitney U tests comparing autistic and
non-autistic participants’ responses to the items comprising the
Autism Awareness Survey revealed that autistic participants
more strongly disagreed that autistic people can outgrow autism
with treatment and that they are violent and more strongly agreed
that autistic people have empathy than non-autistic people (see
Table 3). Non-significant trends toward autistic people more
strongly disagreeing that autistic people do not show attachments
and more strongly agreeing that autistic people show affection
and can grow up to go to college and marry were also observed.
After indicating the degree to which they agreed that autistic
people have empathy (this was the knowledge item that yielded
the largest difference in effect size between autistic and non-
autistic participants), 29% of autistic participants elaborated
upon their responses. Among autistic participants who chose
to elaborate about this question, 36% indicated that autism
is associated with empathy overload (e.g., “excessive empathy
without the ability to turn it off is part of the problem with
being autistic”), 30% stated that autistic people have difficulty
showing empathy (“Absolutely true. . . I am Autistic and I
know lots of Autistics who, like me, have empathy. We just
don’t transmit it to others in the typical way. If the questioner
asking this disagrees, then the questioner needs to learn to
question him or herself ”), 26% indicated that their response
depends on the type of empathy/situation (e.g., “it also depends
on what we mean by empathy: compassion or mind-reading?
We have compassion”), 20% described individual differences in
empathy (“it depends on the person”), and 4% indicated that
autism can be associated with reduced empathy (“not all of
us do”).
Autistic participants also exhibited heightened awareness
of recent changes in what constitutes autism knowledge (see
Appendix A for the specific questions asked). Chi square
tests revealed that autistic participants (61%) more frequently
responded correctly when asked “how many autism spectrum
disorders there are in the DSM-5?” by indicating that there is
one autism spectrum disorder in the DSM-5 than non-autistic
participants (40%), χ2 = 26.64, p < 0.001; ϕ = 0.20. Autistic
participants (93%) also more frequently indicated that autism
is hereditary than non-autistic participants (80%), χ2 = 21.07,
p < 0.001; ϕ = 0.18. However, autistic participants (28%)
less frequently acknowledged potential environmental causes of
autism than their counterparts (53%), χ2 = 40.58, p < 0.001;
ϕ = 0.25. Nuclear family members did not differ from others
in their responses to these questions. A non-significant trend
toward nuclear family members (89%) being more likely than
others (84%) to say that autism is hereditary was observed,
p= 0.05.
TABLE 3 | Autistic and not autistic participants’ average scores on autism awareness survey items.
Autistic mean (SD) Not Autistic Mean (SD) Group comparison Effect size
More Frequent Males 1.20 (1.20) 1.02 (1.33) p = 0.10 r = 0.07
Don’t show attachments −1.48 (0.90) −1.27 (1.10) p = 0.03ˆ r = 0.08
Deliberatively uncooperative −1.58 (0.77) −1.53 (0.84) p = 0.69 r = 0.02
Can go to college/marry 1.73 (0.75) 1.60 (0.89) p = 0.006ˆ r = 0.11
One intervention for all −1.69 (0.87) −1.69 (0.79) p = 0.52 r = 0.03
Proper treatment outgrow −1.61 (0.82) −1.29 (0.97) p < 0.001∗ r = 0.20
Show affection 1.54 (0.80) 1.42 (0.86) p = 0.04ˆ r = 0.08
Most low IQ −1.50 (0.91) −1.55 (0.82) p = 0.81 r < 0.01
Lifelong disability 1.11 (1.29) 1.20 (1.02) p = 0.54 r = 0.02
Violent Tendencies −1.38 (0.93) −1.02 (1.06) p < 0.001∗ r = 0.18
Disinterested friends −1.07 (1.05) −1.01 (1.10) p = 0.56 r = 0.02
Have empathy 1.41 (0.91) 0.85 (1.14) p < 0.001∗ r = 0.27
For bolded items, higher scores indicate less correct responses. ∗ Indicates that groups were significantly different on Mann–Whitney U tests; p ≤ 0.001. ˆIndicates a
non-significant trend; p ≤ 0.05.
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TABLE 4 | Examples of autistic participants’ definitions of autism spectrum disorders.
“A range of neurological phenotypes that affect how autistics perceive sensory input, language, social cues, etc. They also develop along a different
neurodevelopmental trajectory; skills may be delayed or acquired in an atypical order.” I,M
“A different way of perceiving and responding to the world and stimuli” I,N
“I do NOT agree that the autism spectrum is a disorder. I take offense at the those who put together this survey calling AS a disorder. It is a DIFFERENCE. It is actually a
more orderly wiring of the brain, so calling it a disorder is way off base. The extra nerve endings can be disabling. But when people on the spectrum find their hidden
talent, they blossom and are a jewel to behold.” I,M,O
“They are a nonsensical and arbitrary distinction within an obviously gradient set of traits, intended to define the autism continuum as a set of disorders.” O
Internal I, Opposition to medical model O, Autism as neutral difference N, Support medical modelM
Autistic participants provided nuanced definitions of
autism (see Table 4 for examples); their definitions often
simultaneously supported and opposed the medical model.
Autistic participants were less likely to support the medical
model than non-autistic participants (see Table 5 for
statistical results). They were more likely to oppose the
medical model than others. Autistic participants were also
more likely to describe autism as a neutral difference than
others. Autistic participants’ definitions of autism were
coded as internal more often than the definitions of non-
autistic participants. Autistic participants were less likely
to describe core social symptoms in their definitions than
others.3 Instead, they more often highlighted a difference
3This was one of the two findings that were no longer statistically significant
(p = 0.004) in the smaller sample of participants who completed the autism
screener.
between communication and capacity relative to others.4
Nuclear family members’ definitions of autism did not
differ from other participants’ across any of our coding
categories. However, a non-significant trend toward family
members (12%) more often highlighting a difference between
communication and capacity relative to others (6%) was
observed, p= 0.014.
Stigma
A Mann–Whitney U test revealed that autistic participants
(M = 7.23, SD = 2.20) reported lower stigma toward autism
than non-autistic participants (M = 8.12, SD = 3.00), Z = –
4.88; p < 0.001; r = 0.19. Post hoc Mann–Whitney tests
4This was one of the two findings that were no longer statistically significant
(p = 0.009) in the smaller sample of participants who completed the autism
screener.
TABLE 5 | Percentages of autistic and not autistic participants whose definitions of autism spectrum disorder received each qualitative code.
Autistic Not autistic Group comparison Effect size
Communication vs. capacity 13.9 5.2 p < 0.001∗ ϕ = 0.15
Social difficulties 37.5 54.1 p < 0.001∗ ϕ = 0.17
Restricted interests/behaviors 23.9 24.8 p = 0.85 ϕ < 0.01
Internal 68.9 54.7 p < 0.001∗ ϕ = 0.15
Oppose medical model 25.6 10.1 p < 0.001∗ ϕ = 0.20
Neutral difference 35.9 19.6 p < 0.001∗ ϕ = 0.18
Support medical model 54.7 76.5 p < 0.001∗ ϕ = 0.23
Confuse intellectual disability 0.6 0.9 p = 1.00 ϕ = 0.02
Don’t know 0.6 1.5 p = 0.45 ϕ = 0.04
Other 3.6 3.4 p = 1.00 ϕ < 0.01
∗p ≤ 0.001 on chi-square tests.
TABLE 6 | Autistic and not autistic participants’ average scores on items from the Social Distance Scale.
Willingness to engage with someone
with autism in the following ways:
Autistic mean (SD) Not autistic mean (SD) Group comparison Effect size
Move next door 1.14 (0.39) 1.16 (0.48) p = 0.87 r < 0.01
Spend an evening socializing 1.19 (0.48) 1.22 (0.49) p = 0.21 r = 0.05
Collaborate with 1.26 (0.61) 1.29 (0.60) p = 0.28 r = 0.04
Befriend 1.11 (0.36) 1.17 (0.47) p = 0.14 r = 0.06
Have marry into family 1.16 (0.44) 1.39 (0.71) p < 0.001∗ r = 0.18
Marry/date oneself 1.37 (0.76) 1.89 (1.03) p < 0.001∗ r = 0.29
Higher scores indicates greater stigma. ∗p ≤ 0.001 on Mann–Whitney U tests.
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revealed that differences in stigma between autistic and non-
autistic participants were driven by autistic participants’ greater
willingness to have an autistic person marry into the family and
to marry one themselves (see Table 6).
Nuclear family members (M = 7.21, SD = 2.28) also reported
lower stigma than participants without an autistic nuclear family
member (M = 8.31, SD = 3.02), Z = –5.16; p < 0.001;
r = 0.20. Post hoc Mann–Whitney tests revealed that nuclear
family members of autistic people reported lower stigma than
their counterparts for every item of the Social Distance Scale (see
Table 7).
A linear regression predicting the log-transformed stigma
sum, F(9,594) = 8.37, R2 = 0.11, p < 0.001, confirmed that
being autistic (rp = –0.17; p < 0.001) and having a nuclear
family member who was autistic (rp = –0.23; p < 0.001) were
associated with lower stigma. Non-significant trends toward
lower stigma among women (p = 0.002) and gender fluid
participants (p = 0.02) were observed. Stigma was not associated
with having an autistic friend (p = 0.22) or student (p = 0.76),
living in the US (p= 0.57), age (p= 0.08), or education (p= 0.72).
After rating their willingness to marry someone autistic
(the stigma item with the largest effect size), 30% of autistic
participants elaborated upon their responses. Among autistic
participants who chose to elaborate about the question, 38% of
autistic participants’ responses described their prior or current
relationships (e.g., “I am a person with ASD married to a
person with ASD”), 24% indicated that they would prefer an
autistic romantic partner (e.g., “I think I prefer it even though
it’s tumultuous”), 20% indicated that they would prefer a non-
autistic partner (e.g., “I don’t think I could ‘put up’ with
another me”), 13% indicated that they were asexual (e.g., “Not
interested; I’m a solitary, self-reliant person”), 13% indicated
that relationships depend on the type of person (e.g., “I would
marry or date them because I liked/loved them. Not just because
they had autism. To me, my autism is like my hair color. No
matter what I do, it’s a part of who I am. But, it’s just that.
A part of the whole person. (All be it a rather large part)”), 7%
indicated that the question was discriminatory (e.g., “This is so
anti-autistic. Are you autistic yourself? Or do you just work for
Autism Speaks!”), and 1% indicated that it depends on the type
of autism (e.g., “depends on what their traits are. Some are very
annoying.”).
Group Differences in Attitudes toward
Normalization
A Mann–Whitney U test revealed that autistic participants
(M = −1.28, SD = 1.13) said it was less important to find a
cure for autism relative to non-autistic participants (M = 0.20,
SD= 1.55), Z = –11.98; p< 0.001; r = 0.48. Autistic participants
(M = −0.88, SD = 1.30) also said it was less important to
help autistic people appear normal (M = −0.15, SD = 1.41),
Z = –6.61; p < 0.001; r = 0.26. Family members did not differ
from others in the perceived importance of curing/normalizing
autism.
After rating the perceived importance of finding a cure
for autism, 51% of autistic participants elaborated upon
their responses. Among autistic participants who chose to
elaborate about the question, 87% provided neurodiversity-
aligned responses (e.g., “Not just ‘not important.’ I think it’s
detrimental to the lives of autistic people that so much money
is put into finding a cure rather than developing support”), 60%
indicated that autism is not a disease (“I don’t see autism as a
‘syndrome’ or ‘disease’ or ‘disorder’ that needs to be cured. . .,
however if they came out with a ‘cure,’ I wouldn’t deny it to others,
particularly those on the low-functioning end of the spectrum”),
15% indicated support for the medical model (e.g., “I think some
people’s autism benefits them and they are content with being
autistic but I personally struggle with it and it sometimes does
not feel like my life with autism is worth living”), 14% indicated
that autism is diverse (e.g., “I like how I am. I don’t necessarily
like how I was treated. I do see how curing some forms of autism
would be beneficial. I am referring to the forms where the person
can’t move themselves around very well to communicate, but
have normal intelligence and social understanding. As for autism
forms like myself, I think I am fine in certain contexts and would
not seek a cure”) and 12% critiqued the question/researcher
(“HAHAHAHA Cure? Is this test from Autism Speaks?”).
Do Attitudes toward Normalization
Contribute to Stigma?
Spearman’s correlations revealed that heightened stigma toward
autism was associated with more interest in curing autism among
autistic participants, rs (307)= 0.35, p< 0.001, in helping autistic
people appear more normal, rs (307) = 0.35, p < 0.001, and less
TABLE 7 | Average scores on items from the Social Distance Scale of nuclear family members of autistic people and participants without an autistic
nuclear family member.
Willingness to engage with
someone with autism in the
following ways:
Nuclear family mean (SD) Not nuclear family mean (SD) Group comparison Effect size
Move next door 1.11 (0.40) 1.21 (0.48) p < 0.001∗ r = 0.14
Spend an evening socializing 1.12 (0.39) 1.32 (0.57) p < 0.001∗ r = 0.23
Collaborate with 1.18 (0.50) 1.40 (0.70) p < 0.001∗ r = 0.19
Befriend 1.09 (0.37) 1.21 (0.47) p < 0.001∗ r = 0.20
Have marry into family 1.21 (0.53) 1.36 (0.68) p = 0.001∗ r = 0.13
Marry/date oneself 1.50 (0.89) 1.82 (0.98) p < 0.001∗ r = 0.19
Higher scores indicates greater stigma. ∗p ≤ 0.001 on Mann–Whitney U tests.
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knowledge of autism rs (307) = –0.35, p < 0.001. Interest in a
cure, rs (325)= 0.35, p< 0.001, in helping autistic people appear
more normal, rs (325) = 0.34, p < 0.001, and less knowledge, rs
(325) = –0.38, p < 0.001, were also associated with heightened
stigma among non-autistic participants.
A linear regression predicting log-transformed stigma in the
entire sample, F(12,591) = 18.12, R2 = 0.27, p < 0.001, revealed
that greater perceived importance of normalizing autistic people
(rp = 0.15; p < 0.001) and of curing autism (rp = 0.15;
p< 0.001), lower autism knowledge (rp = –0.25; p< 0.001), and
not having an autistic family member (rp = –0.19; p < 0.001)
were associated with heightened stigma. In this model, being
autistic (p= 0.84), having an autistic friend (p= 0.58) or student
(p = 0.85), education (p = 0.15), living in the US (p = 0.49),
age (p = 0.33), being female (p = 0.07), and being gender fluid
(p= 0.43) were not associated with stigma.
DISCUSSION
Findings generally support the notions that autistic people are
autism experts through their lived experiences and reduced
tendency to view autism through a deficit-defined medical
model compared with non-autistic people. Autistic participants
exhibited more knowledge about and less stigma toward autism,
and more often described autism internally, or in terms of
the lived experience of being autistic, than non-autistic people.
They exhibited more awareness of recent changes in the
diagnostic criteria for autism than non-autistic people. These
findings suggest that autistic adults may be highly aware of
diagnostic conceptions of autism, while often critical of their
behavioral, deficit-only basis (Rosqvist, 2012a; Giles, 2014; Linton
et al., 2014). Future research should compare autistic people’s
understanding of autism to perspectives on autism expressed
by autism researchers in order to evaluate the degree to which
autistic people and autism researchers exhibit compatible forms
of autism expertise.
Autistic participants’ conceptions of autism often aligned
with those of the neurodiversity movement, in that they most
frequently described autism as positive or neutral biological
differences, and least frequently endorsed the medical model,
e.g., by exhibiting the least interest in normalization or in
finding a cure for autism. In our sample, less interest in
normalizing autistic people and heightened knowledge of autism
were associated with one another and with lower stigma toward
autism. In addition to neurodiversity-aligned viewpoints, our
findings suggest that other factors, such as experiences with
autistic people, may reduce stigma toward autism. While autistic
people reported far less interest in curing and normalizing
autism than others, both autistic people and family members
exhibited reduced stigma toward autism. Indeed, reduced interest
in normalization and heightened knowledge about autism among
autistic participants accounted for their reduced stigma toward
autism.
A key implication of these findings is that interventions
designed to normalize autistic people and cure-oriented
organizations, legislation, and research may contribute to stigma
toward autism. However, the current findings are correlational.
Future research should examine if exposure to media messages
indicating that autism should be cured and/or that autistic
behaviors should be normalized leads to heightened stigma
toward autism among autistic and non-autistic people.
These findings provide support for the importance of listening
to autistic people and becoming more familiar with their
experiences in order to address and counter stigma. Indeed,
people aware of the neurodiversity movement are more likely to
view autism as a positive identity that does not need a cure (Kapp
et al., 2013). Although superficially surprising, our finding that
numerically more autistic participants supported (55%), rather
than opposed (26%), the medical model in their definitions of
autism is consistent with prior research demonstrating overlap
between the medical model and the neurodiversity movement in
terms of shared recognition of challenges associated with autism
(Kapp et al., 2013), which is consistent with a biopsychosocial
model of autism (Kapp, 2013).
Findings offer clues about how stigmatizing misconceptions
about autism might contribute to marginalizing autistic people
in society. Autistic participants were more likely to recognize
that most children cannot outgrow autism and to reject
a misconceived autism-violence link. Media have repeatedly
covered research on individuals who “lose” an autism diagnosis,
such as a much-publicized newsmagazine article published
during recruitment for this study that interviewed families
of individuals who were described as having beaten autism
(Padawer, 2014). Yet such individuals still have social difficulties
(Orinstein et al., 2015). Autistic people often learn to cope by
selectively masking autistic traits, but such learned behavior
may be effortful and taxing, and does not mean a person is no
longer autistic (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013).
Similarly, empirical evidence has not found autistic people more
likely to commit any crime (King and Murphy, 2014), yet media
speculations about whether serial killers are autistic (Berryessa,
2014), and sympathy for parents who murder their autistic
children (Waltz, 2008; Gross, 2012), may fuel exceptionally
stigmatizing misperceptions of dangerousness (Feldman and
Crandall, 2007).
Additionally, autistic adults were more likely to agree that
autistic people have empathy; as autism by definition involves
atypical social communication, autistic people may express their
connections to others differently while legitimately feeling and
sharing them. Consistent with emerging research (e.g., Smith,
2009), autistic participants frequently reported in their open-
ended elaborations an excess of empathy that they struggled to
express. Indeed, to successfully navigate “typical” society, autistic
people may need to develop an explicit “theory of mind” even
more than other people, with many autistic adults expressing
considerable insights about their own and other minds (e.g.,
McGeer, 2004; Williams, 2004; DeNigris et al., unpublished).
Non-autistic people’s tendency to view autistic people as lacking
insight, aloof, prone to violence, and able to outgrow autism
may lead them to doubt an individual’s autism diagnosis when
that person is knowledgeable, outgoing, or otherwise effective
in self-presentation (Smukler, 2005; Yergeau, 2010; Milton,
2014).
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Limitations and Future Directions
Reliance on a convenience sample of people who were willing and
able to participate in an hour-long survey for no compensation
limits the generalizability of findings. Participants were likely
motivated to participate by an intrinsic interest in autism. Indeed,
participants in this study exhibited substantially more knowledge
of and less stigma toward autism than college students who
participated in previous studies for academic credit (Gillespie-
Lynch et al., 2015; Obeid et al., 2015).
Findings may not generalize to autistic participants who
lack the verbal and computer skills needed to complete the
survey. In addition, our analytic category of “nuclear family
member of an autistic person” contains a great deal of
unexamined variability as we could not distinguish between
nuclear family members whose conceptions of autism were
formed through relationships with autistic family members who
do not speak and/or who have an intellectual disability and
nuclear family members whose conceptions of autism were
formed through relationships with highly verbal and/or gifted
autistic people.
A fairly large number of participants in each group were
unemployed, which suggests that our results (and online
surveys more generally) might over-represent viewpoints of
people who lack other things to do. Given that autistic
people are more likely to engage with the neurodiversity
movement online (Kapp et al., 2013), findings might represent
the views of autism advocacy communities to a greater
extent than samples of autistic participants recruited oﬄine.
Indeed, like autobiographies (Chamak et al., 2008; Davidson
and Smith, 2009) and other online studies (e.g., Kapp et al.,
2013; Pellicano et al., 2014b), this sample included a high
proportion of autistic women and Caucasian individuals.
Although we posted invitations to participate on a wide
variety of Internet sites, including self-advocacy, anti-vaccine,
and pro-cure groups, the degree to which the viewpoints
captured are representative of the broader population remains
unknown.
A key limitation of this study, and other Internet-based
autism research (e.g., Kapp et al., 2013; Pellicano et al., 2014b;
Kenny et al., 2016; Fletcher-Watson et al., 2017), is that we
did not verify diagnosis of participants who self-identified as
autistic. Some participants who self-identified as autistic might
not have met criteria for autism while some participants who
self-identified as not autistic may have been motivated to
participate because they have heightened autistic traits, but
have not been formally diagnosed. Many adults who meet
criteria for autism may lack a formal diagnosis, if not also
self-awareness, of autism (Brugha et al., 2011). Therefore, the
current findings may not be representative of the viewpoints of
many autistic people, including those who do not self-identify
as autistic. Nevertheless, several factors complicate the ability
to diagnose autism in adulthood. Behavioral assessments may
lack sensitivity to coping mechanisms developed by adulthood;
many autistic adults who no longer register on behavioral
tests still demonstrate difficulties typical of autism, and self-
report an autism diagnosis (Lai et al., 2011). Furthermore, many
autistic adults lack reliable records of diagnostic history (Brugha
et al., 2012). Women may be under-diagnosed, in part because
autism may manifest differently in females (Kirkovski et al.,
2013; Linton et al., 2014), who may tend to develop more
superficial compensatory strategies by adulthood (Lai et al.,
2011).
To address these limitations in generalizability, future research
should be conducted online and oﬄine using probability
sampling and should include autistic participants with varied
skills for whom diagnosis can be verified. Given the paucity
of research comparing conceptions of autism across cultures
(Norbury and Sparks, 2013), the inclusion of participants from
around the globe was a potential strength of this study. However,
more equal numbers of participants from different regions
and representing different ethnicities than were obtained in
the current study is needed to gain insights into how cultural
differences may influence conceptions of autism.
CONCLUSION
This study demonstrates that autistic people should be considered
“autism experts” as they often build upon insights derived from
the lived experience of being autistic by researching autism
systematically. Autistic people who have developed heightened
understanding of autism may be particularly well suited to
teach other people about autism, as they tend to endorse less
stigmatizing conceptions of autism, have reduced interest in
making autistic people appear more normal, and may often have
heightened empathy for the challenges others face (Komeda,
2015).
As our participants were adults who were motivated to seek
out dialog about autism by participating in an uncompensated
online study, we do not suggest that all autistic people exhibit
heightened factual knowledge about or reduced stigma toward
autism. As many of our survey respondents indicated, each
person, regardless of whether or not they are autistic, is
unique. Some autistic people seek out factual knowledge about
autism while others believe that they can only be experts
in their own particular form of autism (e.g., Jones et al.,
2013). Autistic people have been reported to gain greater
understanding of autism, themselves, and how to effectively
educate others with age (Jones et al., 2015). The current findings
suggest that autism trainings for autistic youth would benefit
from inclusion of knowledgeable autistic adults as program
mentors.
Findings also provide preliminary support for Nicolaidis’s
(2012) hypothesis that autism awareness campaigns that focus
on the importance of normalizing and curing autistic people do
indeed contribute to stigma toward autism among both autistic
and non-autistic people. Although knowledge is not yet power
for many autistic people, identifying how autistic people think
about autism is a first step toward developing research that
is relevant to their interests and the needs of the community
whom the research is intended to serve. Furthermore, the study
suggests that involving autistic people as well as other people
familiar with and knowledgeable about autism, such as close
relatives, as empowered collaborators in the research process may
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help produce more accurate understanding of autism alongside
greater acceptance and reduced stigma.
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